Open source and hosted boundaries

Maskura has an Apache-2.0 data plane and a separately operated hosted service. This page states the boundary directly so evaluating the open-source project does not require reverse-engineering the commercial model.

In this Apache-2.0 repository

The public repository contains:

• the self-hosted S3-compatible gateway and streaming object data plane;
• the Wasmtime runtime, WIT contracts, built-in filters, and local plugin lifecycle;
• supported storage adapters and routing behavior;
• the maskura CLI and local maskura-mcp stdio server;
• the OpenAPI schema and generated Python and TypeScript clients;
• local file, in-memory, and Postgres-backed credential repositories; and
• tests, benchmarks, security documentation, and architecture decisions for the public engine.

The local Docker quickstart runs without a Maskura account, cloud account, or database. Self-hosted operators choose their own storage, deployment, identity, and operational controls.

In hosted Maskura

The hosted service operates the public gateway engine with separate services for multi-tenant identity and workspace administration, billing and usage accounting, hosted policy management, managed operations, and Maskura Store. Those hosted control-plane and operational services are not part of this Apache-2.0 repository.

The hosted browser preview requires login. This is an abuse-control boundary for a public processing endpoint, not a requirement of the self-hosted engine.

Data boundary

With a self-hosted gateway, Maskura’s hosted service is not in the request path. The operator controls the gateway and destination storage.

With hosted Maskura Gateway, object bytes pass through the operated gateway and then go to the workspace’s configured storage. With Maskura Store, the hosted service also provides the destination storage. The selected pipeline determines whether supported fields are passed through, redacted, or encrypted; Maskura does not claim that every object is automatically confidential.

In either deployment, the gateway operator is trusted during processing. Configuration signatures authenticate artifacts; they do not independently prove which code or policy ran for a read/write. Maskura does not currently provide end-to-end execution attestation, and client-held decryption keys do not prevent the gateway from seeing plaintext while transforming it.

See Security for trust boundaries, fail-closed behavior, feature gates, and operator responsibilities.